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ABSTRACT
Marginal (contingency) tables are the method of choice for government agencies releasing statistical summaries of categorical data. In this paper, we derive lower bounds on how much distortion (noise) is necessary in these tables to ensure the privacy of sensitive data. We extend a line of recent work on impossibility results for private data analysis [9, 12, 13, 15 ] to a natural and important class of functionalities.
Consider a database consisting of n rows (one per individual), each row comprising d binary attributes. For any subset of T attributes of size |T | = k, the marginal table for T has 2 k entries; each entry counts how many times in the database a particular setting of these attributes occurs. We provide lower bounds for releasing all`d k´k -attribute marginal tables under several different notions of privacy.
(1) We give efficient polynomial time attacks which allow an adversary to reconstruct sensitive information given insufficiently perturbed marginal table releases. In particular, for a constant k, we obtain a tight bound of e Ω(min{ √ n, 1 on the average distortion per entry for any mechanism that releases all k-attribute marginals while providing "attribute" privacy (a weak notion implied by most privacy definitions).
(2) Our reconstruction attacks require a new lower bound on the least singular value of a random matrix with correlated rows. Let M (k) be a matrix with`d k´r ows formed by taking all possible k-way entry-wise products of an underlying set of d random vectors from {0, 1}
n . For constant k, we show that the least singular value of M (k) is e Ω( √ d k ) with high probability (the same asymptotic bound as for independent rows).
(3) We obtain stronger lower bounds for marginal tables satisfying differential privacy. We give a lower bound of
INTRODUCTION
The goal of private data analysis is to provide global, statistical properties of a data set of sensitive information while protecting the privacy of the individuals whose records the data set contains. There is a vast body of work on this problem in statistics and computer science. However, until recently, most schemes proposed in the literature lacked rigor: typically, the schemes had either no formal privacy guarantees or ensured security only against a specific suite of attacks.
The seminal results of Dinur and Nissim [9] initiated a rigorous study of the tradeoff between privacy and utility. The notion of differential privacy [12] that emerged from this line of work provides rigorous guarantees even in the presence of a malicious adversary with access to arbitrary side information. Differential privacy requires, roughly, that any single individual's data have little effect on the outcome of the analysis. Recently, many techniques have been developed for designing differentially private algorithms (see [10, 11] for two recent surveys). A typical objective is to release as accurate an approximation as possible to some function f evaluated on the database D.
A complementary line of work seeks to establish lower bounds on how much distortion (noise) is necessary for particular functions f . Some of these bounds apply only to differential privacy (e.g., [12, 18, 19] ); other bounds rule out any reasonable notion of privacy by showing how to reconstruct almost all of the data D given sufficiently accurate approximations to f (D) [9, 13, 15] . We refer to the latter works as lower bounds for minimal privacy.
In this paper, we investigate lower bounds on the distortion necessary for releasing a set of marginal contingency tables ( Marginal tables are the workhorses of categorical data analysis and, in particular, of data analysis in the medical, social and behavioral sciences (e.g., clinical trials, public health studies, and education statistics). In addition to being easy to interpret, they are sufficient statistics for popular classes of probabilistic models [4] . (As a simple example: for binary data, the mean vector and covariance matrix, which capture linear dependencies among attributes, are equivalent to the set of all 2-attribute marginal tables.) Because of this, they are the format of choice for data release by government statistical bureaus [3] . However, many of the fields in which categorical data are used generate highly sensitive data. Researchers and government agencies have ethical and legal responsibilities to protect the confidentiality of the individuals whose data they collect. Consequently, the confidentiality of contingency table releases has been an active topic of research in statistics for over thirty years (see, for example, [17, 30] ). Understanding the extent to which marginal tables can be released while guaranteeing a rigorous, meaningful notion of privacy is an important problem.
Our Contributions
Let C k (D) be the set of all k-way marginal tables (equivalently, the frequencies of all possible k-way conjunctions) for a database D ∈ ({0, 1} d ) n . There are`d k´s uch tables; however, it is convenient to think of C k (D) as a single real vector of length 2
We give lower bounds for simultaneously estimating all the entries of C k (D) privately. As a point of reference, for constant k, the best-known differentially private algorithms [5, 6, 14] 
Here, the e O(·) notation hides polylogarithmic factors in d, n, k. Our lower bounds match this upper bound in different respects.
(1) Lower Bounds for Minimal Privacy: We show that algorithms that do not sufficiently distort the marginal tables fail to satisfy a large class of "privacy" definitions. We define two violations of privacy 2 : attribute non-privacy and row non-privacy.
Each of these rules out a large class of popular definitions of privacy. Row non-privacy rules out definitions that protect an entire row of the database even given leakage of other rows; such definitions include differential privacy as well as several definitions popular in the randomized response literature [33, 1, 16] . Attribute nonprivacy rules out any definition that guarantees the se-2 Alternatively, we might call these "attribute leakage" and "row leakage". We use "non-privacy" for consistency with the previous works [9, 13, 15] . crecy of a particular "sensitive" attribute even when all other attributes are known to an attacker; such definitions include K-anonymity [32] and its variants [23, 22, 7, 24, 34] , as well as the notions ruled out by row non-privacy.
Using a "reconstruction" attack outlined below (2), we show that for any constant k,
per entry allows an adversary to efficiently reconstruct large fraction of the sensitive attribute entries given the nonsensitive values, thus violating attribute privacy (the bound holds even for releasing only all those k-way tables that involve the sensitive attribute and k − 1 other attributes). Moreover, releasing
per entry allows an adversary to efficiently reconstruct large fraction of the rows of D, even though this would not be possible without the release, thus violating row privacy. Both these bounds are (almost) tight, as there is an algorithm which is neither attribute non-private nor row non-private and which for every database D adds e O(min{
The formal bounds for these privacy notions are stated in Table 1 and discussed in Section 2. The bounds on minimal privacy (1) above require significantly different techniques from previous work. Previous lower bounds [9, 13, 15] were based on variants of the following reconstruction problem: given a real-valued matrix M , and a corrupted "codeword" Ms + e, the goal is to compute an approximationŝ to s such that the "reconstruction error"ŝ − s is somehow bounded in terms of the noise vector e. Typically, assuming some norm e p is small, one can bound a related norm ofŝ − s. Returning to data privacy: if s ∈ R n is a database with one number assigned per person, we can think of y = Ms + e as a vector of (distorted) estimates of the quantities Mi, s , where Mi is the ith row of M . Any private data release that allows a user to estimate Mi, s , allows an attacker to obtain y. Therefore, an algorithm for approximating s from y can be used to infer sensitive data from the release.
Previous lower bounds rely heavily on the freedom to design M by selecting the rows of M independently (either at random [9, 13, 15] or from an algebraic code [15] ). When k = 1 a similar flexibility is available in our lower bounds; the matrix M (1) that arises in our lower bounds is a {0, 1} d×n matrix with independent random entries. However, for k > 1 the rows of the matrix M (k) that arises in our lower bounds are highly correlated: the matrix M (k) has d k rows which are formed by taking all possible k-way entry-wise products 3 of the rows of the random matrix M (1) . The techniques of previous work, from the literature on both privacy and random matrices, break down. We show that reconstruction procedures using these matrices can in fact be analyzed, by showing for any constant k that a random (0, 1)-matrix with correlated rows has approximately the same least singular value as a random (0, 1)-matrix with independent rows.
Tight bounds are known on the least singular values of various types of matrices (e.g., square, rectangular) with independent random entries (see, e.g., [28, 29, 27] and references therein). The least singular value of an N × n matrix with (0, 1) independent random entries and N ≥ n is Θ( √ N ) with exponentially high probability (in fact, even non-asymptotic bounds are known, see [29] ). To deal with the dependencies, we develop several new tools, which may be of independent interest. We show that for any constant k if the random matrix M (1) has less than
is e Ω( √ d k ) with exponentially high probability. Therefore, the least singular value of M (k) is asymptotically comparable to that of a d k × n random matrix with independent entries, but M (k) (constructed out of M (1) ) uses far lower randomness.
The proof is challenging because correlations make powerful measure concentration tools hard to apply. We first reduce the problem to bounding the least singular value of a (related) random centered matrixΠ. The smallest singular value ofΠ is the minimum of Π x , over x from the unit sphere. An important tool in the proof is bounding the small ball probability, which is the probability that Π x is small for a fixed vector x. To obtain a uniform lower bound for Π x , we decompose the unit sphere into many pieces, and for each piece use epsilon-net arguments tailored according to the small ball probability. Then, we obtain a uniform lower estimate on the net, which is then extended to the whole unit sphere by approximation.
In the privacy context, our spectral lower bound allows for a reconstruction algorithm of the form
where
inv is an appropriate pseudoinverse of M (k) and round(z) rounds the entries of a vector z to the nearer of 0 and 1. We show that releasing M (k) s with distortion o( √ n) per entry allows the adversary to reconstruct n−o(n) bits of s (that is, to findŝ that agrees in almost all entries of s), as long as n = o(d k ). One can extend the result to get a lower bound of e Ω(min{
(3) Lower Bounds for Differential Privacy: Using a disjoint set of techniques, we show a stronger lower bound for releasing k-way marginal tables under the notion of ( , δ)-differential privacy. The precise bounds are stated in Table 1 and discussed in Section 4. Here, we treat and δ as constants. For constant k, the best-known ( , δ)-differentially private algorithms [5, 6, 14] yield an average distortion per
Our bounds imply that the technique of Blum et al. [5] , which adds Gaussian noise to each entry in C k is tight for large databases (when n = e Ω(d k )). Moreover, for a natural and popular class of algorithms based on adding instance-independent noise [5, 12, 3] , we strengthen this bound to Ω( √ d k ), which is tight for all n.
Our lower bounds for differential privacy extend even to a non-constant k, and here we show a lower bound of e Ω(min{ √ n,
, this is loose by a factor of √ 2 k when compared to the best-known upper bound. This lower bound can again be strengthened for the instanceindependent case (see Table 1 ).
Let A be a differentially private algorithm for C k . The rough idea behind these differential privacy lower bounds is to start with a particular database D and then bound the projection of the mean squared error (MSE) matrix of A(D) along a large set of directions. If the algorithm adds instance-independent noise then we show that this set of directions contains an (almost) orthonormal basis, allowing us to lower bound the trace of the MSE matrix, and hence the average distortion per entry. In the general case (when the distortion is instance-dependent), we use concentration inequalities for matrix-valued random variables to show that for appropriately chosen random databases, the trace of the MSE matrix is large with high probability.
We expect the linear algebraic techniques developed for this bound to be useful for bounding the required distortion of a wide range of differentially private releases.
Significance of the Privacy Lower Bounds
Dinur and Nissim [9] showed that if a mechanism answers (or allows the user to compute) O(n log n) arbitrary inner product queries on a database (vector) s ∈ {0, 1} n with noise o( √ n) per response, then an adversary can reconstruct n − o(n) entries of s. Their attack was subsequently extended to use a linear number of queries [13] , allow a small fraction of answers to be arbitrarily distorted [13] , and run significantly more quickly [15] . These reconstruction attacks provide lower bounds for various minimal notions of privacy; our results extend the scope of these bounds significantly.
There were also several known lower bounds specific to differential privacy, though they are not directly relevant to marginal tables [12, 26, 18] . Subsequently to our work, Hardt and Talwar [19] gave upper and lower bounds for releasing a variety of linear functions (including marginal tables) for the special case of "pure" -differential privacy (with δ = 0). For the case of 1-attribute marginal tables, their bound of Ω(d/ ) improves on ours; we conjecture that their techniques lead to a bound of e Ω(d k / ) for releasing constant k-way marginal tables under -differential privacy. However, their techniques break down for even slightly relaxed privacy notions such as ( , δ)-differential privacy.
We see our new lower bounds as interesting for several reasons.
Natural symmetric functions. In their simplest form, the inner product queries considered by [9, 13, 15] require the adversary to be able to "name rows", that is, specify a coefficient for each entry of the vector s.
Thus, the lower bound does not apply directly to any functionality that is symmetric in the rows of the data set such as marginal tables. It was pointed out in [8] that in databases with more than one entry per row, random inner product queries (on, say, attribute x d ) can be simulated via hashing: for example, the adversary could ask for the sum of the function H(x1, . . . , x d−1 )·x d over the whole database, where
is an appropriate hash function. This is a symmetric query, but it might seem odd to a statistician (with, e.g., a 2-wise independent hash function). The lower bounds we give for marginal table releases are the first for symmetric functions regularly released by official statistical agencies; one can think of our reconstruction attacks as using conjunctions as weak hash functions to implement the idea of [8] .
Privacy Guarantee Upper Bound on Noise Lower Bound on Noise
Attribute privacy When is distortion acceptably low? It is natural to ask at what point the distortion required for privacy interferes with statistical analysis. There is no simple answer, but for the "predicate queries" considered here, where each entry counts the number of occurrences of a predicate in the underlying data set, there is a large class of statistical models which inherently have "sampling error", that is standard deviation of the observed statistics, of Ω( √ n). A crude rule of thumb, then, is that the distortion interferes seriously when it is not o( √ n) [12, 3, 31] . Our lower bounds of e Ω(min(
show that for even modest values of d and k, the data set n must be very large to get distortion o( √ n). The "dimension" of marginal tables. The reconstruction attacks [9, 13, 15] above show a lower bound of roughly min{ √ n, √ m} on the distortion required to answer a set of m random, independent queries about a data set of size n. However, the bounds heavily rely on independence of the queries. This raises the question of whether certain interesting classes of queries could be answered with much less noise. For example, if a set of queries is linearly dependent, then one can compute noisy answers to only a few queries (a spanning set), and deduce the rest using the linear relationships. Both of our bounds can be interpreted as showing that the marginal statistics of a data set are, in a sense that depends on the notion of privacy, far from any low dimensional subspace. In particular, we show that the`d k´2 k different entries of the k-way marginal tables hide a set of Ω(d k ) "nearly independent" underlying features -as far as privacy is concerned, they have dimension close to`d k´. It is natural to ask: what properties of a set of queries lead to this type of behavior, in general? Our techniques suggest that the right notion is related to inapproximability by low-dimensional linear spaces, however, it is unclear how to formulate this notion precisely.
Known Upper Bounds for Diff. Privacy
In [5, 12] it was shown that addition of carefully calibrated noise to functions satisfying a Lipschitz condition is enough to ensure differential privacy. Applied to conjunctions, they show that random noise drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation [5] , while adding random noise drawn from a Laplacian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 2`d k´/ to each entry in C k (D) guarantees -differential privacy (with δ = 0) [12] . Barak et al. [3] improve the dependency on k in these results, saving a factor of approximately √ 2 k in the required distortion.
In a different vein, Blum et al. [6] adapt the exponential sampling technique of [25] to release a synthetic data set. One can use their techniques to release C k (D) with distortion e O((n 2 dk/ ) 2/3 ) in each entry . The dependency on d and k in [6] is much better than in the additive noise mechanisms, but the dependency on n is significantly worse; in particular, our results show that one cannot significantly reduce the dependency on n without incurring a dependency on d k . Finally, Dwork et al. [14] provide a similar, but incomparable, synthetic data mechanism, which allows one to release all k-way conjunctions with distortion e O(
Preliminaries
We use [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. We use negl(n) denotes a function that is asymptotically smaller than 1/n c for all c > 0. Vectors used in the paper are by default column vectors. For a vector v, v denotes its transpose (row vector), v denotes its Euclidean norm, and vi denotes its ith entry. We use uv to denote the unit vector corresponding to v (i.e., uv = v/ v ). For two vectors v1 and v2, v1, v2 denotes the inner product of v1 and v2. The length of projection of v1 onto v2 is then v1, v2 / v2 . For a matrix M , tr(M ) denotes the trace and M ∞ denotes the operator norm. We use diag(a1, . . . , an) to denote an n × n diagonal matrix with entries a1, . . . , an along the main diagonal. Let -way conjunction predicates on variables x1, . . . , x 
LOWER BOUNDS -MINIMAL PRIVACY
In this section, we introduce a reconstruction attack based on analyzing the least singular value of a random matrix with correlated entries. We then use the reconstruction attack to establish lower bounds on the noise needed for releasing k-way marginal tables under the notions of attribute non-privacy and row non-privacy. We treat k as a constant in this section.
The lower bounds for our minimal privacy definitions proceed by "reducing" an instance of the reconstruction problem for a matrix with correlated rows into a marginal table release problem. To define the reduction from the reconstruction problem, we need the following definition of entry-wise product of vectors and matrices. We now formally define attribute non-privacy and row non-privacy, and explain the reductions from the reconstruction problem.
Definition 2.2 (Attribute Non-Privacy). An algorithm A for releasing all k-way conjunction predicates is attribute non-private if there exists a polynomial time adversary such that for every s ∈ {0, 1}
n there exists a database
whose last column is s, such that the adversary with input A(Dat(s)) and the first d − 1 columns of Dat(s), can reconstruct at least e Ω(min{n, d k−1 }) entries of s with probability 1 − negl(d).
This definition captures a common model in the data privacy literature (e.g., [32, 23, 22, 7, 24, 34] ) where one assumes that a database (with d attributes) consists of d − 1 nonsensitive attributes (e.g., demographic information), which can be learned from other sources, and one sensitive attribute (e.g., disease). The attribute non-privacy lower bound applies to any notion of privacy that purports to protect individual values of the sensitive attribute (the lower bound applies in particular, to differential privacy but also, e.g., to the notion of privacy implicit in the popular "Kanonymization" scheme [32] and its recent variants [23, 22, 7, 24, 34] ). 
There exists a polynomial time adversary such that if D ∼ D, the adversary on input A(D) can output 1 − o(1) fraction of the rows of D indexed by the elements of S with probability 1 − negl(d).
The row non-privacy lower bound applies, roughly, to any notion of privacy that seeks to protect any complete row of the database (as opposed to only individual entries). This includes differential privacy as well as its relaxations to metrics on probability distributions such as total variation distance or KL divergence [12, 33, 1, 16] .
Reduction from the Reconstruction Problem to Row Non-Privacy: Consider a matrix M ∈ {0, 1}
d×n . Consider 
Lower Bounds -Reconstruction Problem
Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ {0, 1} n be some (secret) vector. Let c k be a constant (we will define it later in Theorem 2.5). Let the integer a = min{n, c k d k / log 2k−2 n} (to simplify the exposition, we shall ignore rounding issues). Let s|a = (s1, . . . , sa) be the first a entries of s. Let Φ ∈ {0, 1} a be a vector with independent entries taking values 0 and 1 with probability 1/2. Let Φ1, . . . ,
The attack works as follows: for every row R in M (k) , the adversary asks inner product of R with s|a, and receives noisy responses. Consider a privacy mechanism A. Let p = A(M (k) s|a) be the vector of noisy answers generated by A. 
Define the error (noise) vector as
e = p − M (k) s|a. Let M (k) = P ΓQ−1 = (diag(σ1(M (k) ) −1 , . . . , σa(M (k) ) −1 )|0 ). The dimension of Γ −1 is a × d k . Define M (k) inv = Q Γ −1 P .
Now, given p, the adversary uses M (k)
inv to constructŝ = (ŝ1, . . . ,ŝa) as follows:ŝi = 1 if the ith entry in M (k) inv p ≥ 1/2, and 0 otherwise. Now, the claim is thatŝ is a good reconstruction of s|a. The idea behind the analysis is that M
inv e, and therefore (as P and Q are orthogonal matrices),
Corollary 2.6 shows that with high probability σa(
If an algorithm only adds o( √ n) noise to each query (i.e., all the entries in e are o(
√ n) with high probability. In particular, if a = n, then this implies that with high probability M (k) inv e cannot have Ω(n) entries with absolute value above 1/2, and therefore, the Hamming distance betweenŝ and s|a is o(a) = o(n) (as the adversary only fails to recover those entries of s|a whose corresponding M (k) inv e entries are greater than 1/2). The following proposition formalizes this observation. The proof uses some ideas from a recent reconstruction attack proposed by Dwork and Yekhanin [15] .
Proposition 2.4. Let k be a constant. If an algorithm adds
o(min{ √ n/ log (k 2 +k+1) n, √ d k / log (k 2 +3k−1) n}) noise to each entry in M (k) s|a,
then there exists an adversary that can reconstruct 1 − o(1) fraction of s|a with probability at least 1 − negl(d).
The proof of the above proposition relies heavily on the following theorem that lower bounds the least singular value of a random matrix with correlated rows. A proof outline of the theorem is given in the Section 3. 
Now, as M is a d × a matrix with independent entries taking values 0 and 1 with probability 1/2, and a ≤ c k d k / log 2k−2 n, we can apply the above theorem to conclude the following.
Attribute Non-Privacy
We use the reduction from the reconstruction attack described earlier. Define, a vectorΦj ∈ {0, 1} n as follows: the ith entry inΦj is the ith entry of Φi if i ≤ a, and is 0 otherwise. For a vector s ∈ {0, 1} n , define a database Dat(s) ∈ ({0, 1} 
-way marginal tables (or equivalently all k-way conjunction predicates) that for every database
noise to each entry in A(D) is attribute non-private.
Row Non-Privacy
Again, we use the reduction from the reconstruction attack described earlier . For a vector s ∈ {0, 1} n , define a database Dst(s) ∈ ({0, 1} d ) n as follows: (i, j)th entry of Dst(s) is si if the ith entry inΦj = 1, and 0 otherwise. We assume that the adversary has access to Φ1, . . . , Φ d . Define a distribution D over the set of databases as follows: draw a vector sr uniformly at random from {0, 1} n and output Dst(sr). Let consider some ith row where i ∈ [a]. Let E be the event that there exists a Φj such that ith entry in Φj is 1. Conditioned on event E, an adversary can only predict the ith row of Dst(sr) by guessing the ith entry in sr. Since sr is picked uniformly at random, this implies that conditioned on E no adversary can guess the ith row of Dst(sr) with probability more than 1/2. Finally, since Pr[E] = 1/2 d , therefore, no adversary (even with access to Φ1, . . . , Φ d ) can guess the ith row of Dst(sr) with probability more than 1/2 + 1/2 d ≤ 2/3. Thus, D satisfies the first condition of Definition 2.3 for every set S. The following theorem uses this distribution D to obtain a lower bound on the noise needed for row privacy.
Theorem 2.8. Let k be a constant. Any algorithm for releasing all k-way marginal tables (or equivalently all kway conjunction predicates) that for every database
noise to each entry in A(D) is row non-private.
PROOF OUTLINE OF THEOREM 2.5
Estimating the smallest singular value of the matrixÃ presents two challenges. The entries of this matrix are interdependent, which makes powerful measure concentration tools hard to apply. Also, the entries are non-centered, and hence its operator norm is of order √ d k n with high probability. The norm of the matrix enters many probabilistic bounds involved in the proof, and such a large norm would render most of these bounds meaningless. To remove these obstacles, we apply a simple decoupling and symmetrization argument to reduce the problem to bounding the smallest singular value of a matrixΠ, which is an entry-wise product of Π1, . . . , Π k , where each Πi is a d × n matrix with independent random entries taking values −1 with probability 1/4, 1 with probability 1/4, and 0 with probability 1/2. Note that the entries in Πi are centered. Analysis of the behavior of the least singular value ofΠ is the core of the argument.
The first step in this analysis is obtaining a probabilistic bound for the operator norm ofΠ. This bound is proved by induction on k, with Talagrand's measure concentration inequality for convex functions (see [21] , Corollary 4.10) applied at each step. We show that with high probability,
for all non-empty subsets J ⊂ {1, . . . , n}. HereΠ|J denotes the submatrix ofΠ with columns belonging to J, and c k is a constant depending on k only. The smallest singular value ofΠ is the minimum of Π x , over x from the unit sphere. Before we analyze this quantity in full generality, we consider a simpler question of estimating the small ball probability. This is the probability that Π x is small for a fixed vector x. Measure concentration plays a prominent role in this estimate as well. To apply measure concentration tools, we have to represent Π x as a function of independent random variables. This is done by conditioning on the matrices Π1, . . . , Π l−1 and Π l+1 , . . . , Π k , for some l ∈ {1, . . . , k}. In this case the random variable Π x depends only on the matrix Π l with independent entries.
The number l ∈ {1, . . . , k} is chosen to match the level of compressibility of the vector x. A vector is compressible if its norm is concentrated on a small number of coordinates. Note that the coordinates of the vectorΠx consist of d . . . Π l−1 this becomes the product of a fixed matrix B yi and a random vector Π l (j) with independent coordinates. The small ball probability bound for such vector can be obtained by applying Talagrand's concentration theorem for convex functions to the function F (w) = (B yi)w . The level of concentration is determined by the Lipschitz constant of the function F , i.e., by the norm of the matrix B yi. This norm, in turn, is controlled using the inequality (1) applied to the matrix B.
We can obtain a uniform bound for the entire sphere via a net argument. Unfortunately, since the small ball probability for Π x depends significantly on the vector x, it is impossible to construct one net that would work for the whole sphere. Therefore, we decompose the sphere in numerous regions, and estimate the probability that Π x is small for each part separately. The regions are defined by the small ball probability, which depends on the compressibility of the vectors. For each part we apply a net argument especially tailored for a certain degree of compressibility. Namely, the region is discretized, by using a γ-net for appropriate γ. Then we obtain a uniform lower estimate on the net, using the small ball probability and the union bound. This estimate is extended to the whole region by approximation. This method requires a careful balance between the small ball probability and the size of the net. The better the small ball probability is, the bigger a net we can consider, and so the bigger region we can cover. This balance dictates the aforementioned decomposition of the sphere.
We start with obtaining a uniform estimate of Π x over a set of all vectors x having a given level of sparsity. We then extend the bound from the set of sparse vectors to the set of compressible vectors with a certain level of compressibility. Finally, we show that the whole sphere can be assembled from these sets. This allows to finish the proof by using the union bound. See the full version [20] for a complete proof.
LOWER BOUNDS -DIFF. PRIVACY
In this section, we establish lower bounds on the noise needed for releasing all k-way marginal tables under the popular notion of differential privacy. A database D is said to be a neighbor of a database D if it differs from D in exactly one row. A randomized algorithm is differentially private if neighbor databases induce nearby distributions on the outputs. 
Definition 4.1 (( , δ)-differential privacy [12]). A randomized algorithm A is ( , δ)-differentially private if for all neighboring databases D, D , and for all sets S of possible outputs
We also use X ≈ Y to indicate that random variables X and Y are ( , 0)-indistinguishable.
Our bounds are tight under a natural and popular class of differentially private algorithms based on adding instanceindependent noise. This class contains algorithms that for all inputs add noise from a fixed distribution (i.e., the noise distribution is independent of the input). Formally, if an algorithm A for a function class F adds instance-independent noise from a distribution Z then for all D,
. The SuLQ algorithm of Blum et al. [5] is an example of an algorithm that adds instance-independent noise.
In Section 4.1, we consider ( , δ)-differentially private algorithms for C k that add instance-independent noise. For an instance-independent differentially private algorithm A, we can measure the perturbation introduced by A either by using the mean squared error matrix The analysis of the general case is harder, because now the indistinguishability requirement forces only one among these two projection lengths to be greater than the squared length of Δ. Our proof looks at random databases and shows that for a random database Dr with high probability the trace of ΣA(Dr) is at least min{m
Inner Products. In our analysis, (for simplicity) instead of conjunctions, we consider inner products over the do- 
Instance-independent Additive Case
For simplicity, we set δ = 0 in the following discussion (we will introduce δ in Theorem 4.6). We start by proving a very useful property about differential privacy. We state the lemma in terms of a general function class F and later use if for our specific function class I k . Let A be an -differentially private algorithm for F that adds instanceindependent noise. The lemma shows that both E The third equality follows as trace and expectation commute. The last equality follows as π is a projection matrix. Now, using Lemma 4.4, we show that 
Lower Bounds -General Case
Again our analysis looks at the related problem of releasing inner products. We initially prove the lower bound by fixing to 1/2. We start by proving an extension of Lemma 4.2 to general differentially private algorithms. Let 2 ] needn't be Δ 4 , but the following lemma shows that at least one of them is Δ 4 (this one-sided behavior is in fact unavoidable and is explained in the full version [20] ). 
